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ARTICLE
KEEPING IP REAL
IrinaD. Manta*
ABSTRACT

This symposium contribution analyzes the relationship
between intellectual property and tangible property, focusing on
four types of intellectual property: copyrights, trademarks,
patents, and trade secrets. It posits that-contrary to popular
conceptions-the question of rivalrousness should be viewed as
central both to owners' use of IP-protected goods and to others'
infringement of the underlying IP rights (just as that attribute lies
at the heart of the concept of real and other tangible property).
Rivalrousness typically arises where consumption of a good by a
consumer prevents simultaneous consumption of that good by
other consumers or, in the tangible property context, where
simultaneous physical occupation of the same space is impossible.
This symposium piece, however, adopts an understanding of
rivalrousness that rests on economic rather than physical
conceptions of rivalrousness. Previous scholarship, including my
own, has questioned the boundary between intellectual property
and tangible property by examining binary conceptions of
rivalrousness, whereby physical goods (including real property)
are understood to be completely rivalrous, and intangible goods
*
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completely nonrivalrous. This piece studies in depth how "(real)
property-like" the different forms of intellectual property are when
it comes to economic rivalrousness, and concludes that most
trademarks and trade secrets hew quite closely to our
understanding of real property and other tangible property as far
as economic rivalrousness is concerned. There is more variance in
that respect within copyrights and patents (with the associated
goods often ranging from not rivalrous at all to highly rivalrous),
which suggests that there may be more flexibility in those areas
when granting rights to third parties. For copyright and patent
rights, economic space might be more shareable than for
trademarks or trade secrets, in the sense that the goods can
sometimes more easily coexist in the market without the owner of
the original intellectual property suffering profit losses.
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INTRODUCTION

Battles over whether intellectual property should qualify as
property have raged on for many years.' For a number of
1.
See generally Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 719 (2016) (conducting an eminent domain analysis of some of the provisions of the
America Invents Act); Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the
Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005) (comparing the costs and
benefits of the copyright versus property law systems); Justin Hughes, Copyright and
Incomplete Historiographies:Of Piracy, Propertization,and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL.
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individuals, what has been at the heart of that debate is not only
nomenclature and a wish for linguistic precision, but also a desire
to push intellectual property law in the direction of more versus
less protection. 2 Indeed, as I have described in previous work,
words like property, theft, and piracy come with a psychological
valence that both advocates and judges have employed to promote
particular outcomes. 3 On the flip side, those who oppose these
outcomes have sought to move scholars and the public at large
away from such rhetoric. 4 The question "is intellectual property
truly property?" implies an unhelpful binariness-but one which
in itself matters to some advocates. Individuals who wish to see
intangible goods protected similarly to the way property law
protects tangible goods unsurprisingly want intellectual property
to definitionally remain in the camp of property;5 those who
believe that we overprotect intellectual property are often
committed to highlighting how intangible goods, like literary
works or inventions, are entirely different from tangible goods like
land or chattels.6
L. REV. 993 (2006) (discussing the historical use of the term "property" in the intellectual
property context); Irina D. Manta & Robert E. Wagner, Intellectual PropertyInfringement
as Vandalism, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 331 (2015) (explaining why intellectual property
infringement is better characterized as vandalism or trespass, as opposed to theft); Adam
Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687 (2013) (making the
assertion that analogizing patent infringement to real property trespass is a conceptual
error); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Puttingthe Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.
371, 426 (2003) ("Copyright is defined and protected in the American legal system as a
property right within the domain of intellectual property. Therefore, to connect copyright
to the broader concept and institutional definition of property better grounds this legal
doctrine within our legal system as such."). Further sources on this topic can be found in
James Y. Stern, Intellectual Property & the Myth of Nonrivalry 10 nn.23-38 (working paper)
(on file with author).
2.
See Manta & Wagner, supra note 1, at 336.
3.
See id. at 339-41.
4.
As David Fagundes has stated, "Every great story has a villain, and in the story
told by enthusiasts of the public domain, that villain is property." David Fagundes, Crystals
in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 140 (2009).
5.
See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 34-36
(2005) (advocating for a propertized view of copyright). This is also apparent in court
decisions, such as one in which a district court judge stated multiple times that a defendant
"physically stole" software by loading his employer's software program onto a laptop and
then traveling with that laptop through channels of interstate and international commerce.
See United States v. Alavi, No. CRO7-429-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 1971391, at *2 (D. Ariz.
May 2, 2008).
6.
See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, CabiningIntellectual Property Through a Property
Paradigm,54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004) (criticizing the propertization of intellectual property law
and its unwillingness to impose limits on intellectual property owners); Dan Hunter,
Culture War, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1105, 1122 (2005) ("[I]ntellectual property is not property in
the sense that we typically understand it in capitalist systems: most obviously, the grant of
the interest from the state does not last in perpetuity, it is subject to all manner of
limitations and challenges, the 'property' at issue is nonrivalrous, and so on."). Some forms
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It has been part of my scholarly mission to introduce greater
nuance into some of these conversations. For example, I have
argued that intellectual property infringement is neither identical
to nor completely separate from the act of theft, but rather
constitutes (depending on the situation) either vandalism or
trespass.7 As part of that project, I also examined and compared
the criminal and civil sanctions that we impose for intellectual
property versus property offenses, ultimately concluding that
advocates of the propertization of intangible goods have at times
managed to convince decision-makers to allow sanctions that in
fact exceed even the strongest version of sanctions for tangibleproperty infringement.8 If intellectual property is conceptually the
same as property, why should harm of a certain level yield greater
sanctions in the world of intangible goods? The answer may be that
advocates of propertization indeed care less about consistency
than about results-not that the same is not true of many
opponents of propertization.
One of the ideas that opponents of intellectual property
propertization like to promote is that intellectual property is
generally nonrivalrous. 9 Several people can usually listen to a song
at the same time without interfering with one another's use.
Multiple individuals can use the knowledge of how to produce a
lifesaving drug or apply a curative technique without diminishing
its effectiveness. Therefore, opponents argue, for that and other
reasons, intangible goods are fundamentally different from a piece
of land that cannot be occupied by multiple people simultaneously
or a teacup whose concurrent use by several individuals causes
immediate problems.
The stakes are higher than they appear at first because the
outcome of the challenge over rivalry has teeth. Simplifying to an
extent, there is sometimes a sense of "if it's not rivalrous, it would
be plainly selfish not to share it" underlying the formal nature of
the argument. Sure, developing a complex HIV treatment is
expensive, but now that this has taken place, perhaps we could
share the treatment with developing countries that cannot afford
of intellectual property, however, such as trademarks and trade secrets are potentially
granted for perpetuity; property rights can be cut short through a number of devices like
eminent domain and adverse possession; property rights are not unlimited; and the
nonrivalrousness is only present for IP in the strict physical sense of the term.
7.
See Manta & Wagner, supra note 1.
See id. at 344-53.
8.
9.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75
TEX. L. REV. 873, 902 (1997) (book review) ("[T]he public nature of a good seems to suggest
that propertization is a uniquely bad idea, precisely because the consumption of that good
is 'nonrivalrous'-it does not take away from the creator of that good.").
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Western pharmaceutical prices? After all, an American individual
will not suffer reduced drug effectiveness as a result of this
sharing. And, less dramatically, might not the same be true if
someone poor (or even not-so-poor) illegally downloads and listens
to Taylor Swift's latest hit without paying? Of course, this line of
reasoning contains several flaws, including a focus on static
rivalrousness that only considers conflicts between existing
resources at the cost of a dynamic understanding of conflicts
between existing and potential future resources. 10
Part of the issue, which forces binary answers to these sorts
of questions, arises precisely from an overly narrow definition of
rivalrousness that has dominated the discourse. The emphasis has
been on physical impossibility, such as the impossibility for two
individuals to stand on the same plot of land at the same time.
Rivalrousness that encompasses economic
and hedonic
consequences, however, is the more relevant consideration
whether we are talking about tangible or intangible goods.1 1 I have
argued in favor of this expanded understanding many times in my
previous work, 12 and more recently, James Stern has provided his
own extensive discussion of that issue. 13
This arguably more capacious view of rivalrousness allows for
a more fine-grained analysis of the doctrines that govern different
types of intellectual property. Indeed, such an understanding
reveals that each good-whether tangible or intangible-lies on a
spectrum of rivalrousness, and that its position on this spectrum
ought to influence the contours of the law. While there is some
fluidity regarding this position that is, in turn, influenced by legal
dictates, some types of goods will present inherent difficulties if
we attempt to share them between actors. This is especially true
for trademark and trade secret rights, but the problem can also
arise for some kinds of copyrights and patents. Conversely, a lack
of inherent-as opposed to legally created-rivalrousness may
suggest that the question of sharing is more open, and that other
factors will require examination before dismissing out of hand the
idea of sharing.

10.
See infra Section III.D (discussing static versus dynamic rivalrousness).
11.
This is analogous to the "overgrazing" problem that scholars such as William
Landes and Richard Posner have indicated can at times arise in intellectual property. See
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. Ciii. L.
REV. 471, 485-88 (2003); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw. U.
L. REV. 907, 918-19 (2004) (highlighting the overgrazing problem for nonrivalrous goods
such as songs or theories).
12.
See infra Section II.B.
13.
See Stern, supra note 1, at 10-16.
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Part II will discuss the issue of rivalrousness at large and the
effect it has had on conversations about intellectual property. Part
III will examine how the issue of rivalrousness plays out in specific
contexts within copyright, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets,
and find that its effects differ by type of intangible good. This
teaches lessons as to the shape that intellectual property doctrines
should take within each subarea and provides tools to understand
how much protection as-of-yet undeveloped types of intangible
goods should receive. Part IV concludes.
II.

A.

RIVALROUSNESS AND ITS PLACE IN THE LAW

The Concept of Rivalrousness

The idea of rivalrousness appears across many different types
of resources. As Brett Frischmann has stated: "(Non)rivalry, or
(non)rivalrousness of consumption, is a function of resource
capacity and the degree to which one person's consumption of a
resource affects the potential of the resource to meet the demands
of others. It reflects the marginal cost of allowing an additional
person to consume a good." 1 4 The law at times steps in where there
are resource conflicts, meaning incompatible demands upon the
same resource, such as in a case in which two individuals want to
eat the entirety of the same apple.1 5
Examples of rivalrous resources abound when it comes to land
and chattels. Two or more people cannot stand in the exact same
spot at the same time. They cannot write different things with the
same pen simultaneously. And they cannot chew the exact same
piece of gum at once. These instances involve a purely physical
understanding of rivalrousness, and literal impossibility under the
laws of nature.
Focusing on this aspect automatically turns all intangible
property nonrivalrous, indeed. After all, it is virtually never
physically impossible for a large number of people to sing the same
song at the same time, for a dozen companies to use the same
brand name for a dozen candy bars, or for many different entities
to use a single pharmaceutical formula to create the same pill
across a multitude of factories and countries.
The traditional story goes that property arises due to the fact
that "[i]t supplies a normative principle that establishes the
priority of claims to control [a physical good], in the sense of
14.

BRETT M.

FRIsCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE:

RESOURCES 26 (2012).
See Stern, supra note 1, at 10-11.
15.

THE SOCIAL VALUE

OF SHARED
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determining which uses of it are permitted and which are not." 1 6
The justifications behind having property law vary, with Lockean
labor theory, Hegelian personhood theory, and utilitarianism
figuring as prominent.17
For the most part, the United States currently has a
functioning property law system in which most individuals have a
fairly solid understanding of what resources are theirs and which
ones are not. While most Americans understand and respect
property law, neither is as uniformly true when it comes to
intellectual property rights. Especially for copyright law, there is
vast confusion as to what is permitted when it comes to questions
like what level of similarity between two works is allowed, or what
types of fan work qualify as fair use. And even beyond confusion,
the lack of physical rivalrousness for intangible resources makes
people feel less guilty about knowingly infringing upon intellectual
property.18

B. Rivalrousness in Intellectual Property Generally
As comedian Mindy Kaling quipped about the ads that have
appeared before movies stating that people should not download
illegally just like how they would not steal a car:
And I was thinking about it, I was watching it and I was like,
You know what? I would steal a car if it was as easy as
touching the car and then thirty seconds later I owned the
car. And, like, I would steal a car if by stealing the car, the
person who owned the car, they got to keep the car. And um, I
would also steal a car if no one I had ever met had ever
bought a car before in their whole lives. 19
Mindy Kaling may not be an outlier in failing to take
infringement of intangible goods as seriously as theft of chattels.

16.
Id. at 11.
17.
See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier & Greg Lastowka, Against Cyberproperty, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1485, 1493-96 (2007) (describing these three frameworks of
traditional justifications of property law).
18.
See Robert Eres et al., Why Do People Pirate?A NeuroimagingInvestigation, 12
J. Soc. NEUROSCIENCE 366, 366-67 (2016) (discussing the reason why people are more
inclined to infringe on intellectual property rights than property rights and examining the
possible roots of this inclination). One should note that the law awards enhanced damages
for willful infringement of intellectual property law regardless of the subjective perceptions
of infringers about the wrongfulness of their conduct. Justin P. Huddleson, Objectively
Reckless: A Semi-Empirical Evaluationof In re Seagate, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 102,
116-17 (2009).
19.
Megalong & Kyrafic, Fuck Yeah Mindy Kaling, TUMBLR (Feb. 16, 2011, 8:31 AM),
http://fuckyeahmindy.tumblr.com/post/3326431414/i-was-at-the-movies-yesterday-and-bef
ore-the-movie [https://perma.cc/TE5W-KQRH?type=image] (emphasis added).
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Indeed, even neuroimaging data suggests that the thought of
performing the latter (when compared to the former) results in
greater activation of cerebral areas associated with responses to
morally laden situations, which the researchers concluded may
help explain why people are more willing to infringe on intangible
goods. 20
In property law, we first tend to notice the deprivation of the
rivalrous good when mourning that an individual has become the
victim of theft. But when the property belongs to a corporation or
was used for some other kind of commercial purpose, our focus
shifts to the monetary value of the good. The fact of the matter is
that both individuals and companies can be affected by
infringements on goods due to either physical or economic and
hedonic rivalrousness.
Imagine two adjacent restaurants with competing owners,
one of whom steals the fancy cappuccino machine owned by the
other. Assuming that he does not get caught, the thief will now be
able to charge more money for his coffee than before and divert the
flow (no pun intended) of customers to his own establishment.
There are still plenty of other cappuccino machines in the world,
and the previous owner can buy a new one for his establishment.
He is, however, worse off than before: both because he had to spend
money on the new machine and because he is now competing with
someone who had no machine at all before the theft. Indeed, the
latter problem would remain even if a rich benefactor who felt
sorry for the victim gave him a new machine for free.
In the scenario with the rich benefactor, the problem of
physical rivalrousness has seemingly been resolved-both
restaurants have a cappuccino machine, hooray! Yet, we remain
uncomfortable from both a general ethical perspective of what we
perceive as unfair competition by the thief, and from a utilitarian
standpoint that suggests that this may provide unfortunate
incentives to other potential thieves and deterrence to nonthieving
entrepreneurs. And this brings us to the problem that focusing on
physical, rather than economic or even hedonic, rivalrousness may
present a limited picture of the true harm of theft or
infringement. 21

Eres et al., supra note 18, at 366-67, 375.
20.
21.
For a view of property through a hedonic lens, see generally David Fagundes,
Buying Happiness: Property, Acquisition, and Subjective Well-Being, 58 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1851 (2017).
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I have argued previously that rivalrousness should
encompass these broader values. 22 Other voices-most notably
that of James Stern-have joined the push for an understanding
of rivalrousness that exceeds the mere risk of purely physical
clashes over resources and includes problems such as that of
conflicting economic use. 2 3 As he explains, a strong case can be
made that rivalrousness is "[n]on-dichotomous, subjective,
relational, contingent." 24 Whether we consider intellectual
property rivalrous or not hinges on the willingness to expand the
traditional boundary of physical limitations, and this symposium
piece endorses doing just that.
As understood here, rivalrousness is thus present when two
intellectual property goods cannot coexist without having a
(unidirectional or bi-directional) negative effect on each other's
economic value, hedonic value, or both. 25 Economic value
encompasses the actual and potential, current and future revenue
stream that an owner derives from her intellectual property good.
Hedonic value includes the actual and potential, current and
future joy, happiness, or personal meaning that an owner and/or
permitted users derive from that good. Analyzing rivalrousness
must also answer questions regarding value, i.e., when and to
whom, as well as consider interactions between different types of
values.
For example, as discussed in greater detail below, a new
movie may incorporate a quotation from a pre-existing copyrighted
book in such a way as to reduce the hedonic-and perhaps
economic-value of the book to its author but provide hedonic and
economic value to the maker of the movie as well as hedonic value

See Manta & Wagner, supra note 1, at 338 ("[I]ntellectual property can-contrary
22.
to popular wisdom-be rivalrous at times... . The more rivalrous intellectual property
turns out to be in a given case, the more it resembles property and the more its infringement
parallels theft."); Irina D. Manta, Hedonic Trademarks, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 276-77 (2013)
("[S]hared use of a trademark may take on a rivalrous nature such as to diminish the
enjoyment of original goods without an equivalent resulting benefit . . . ."). For a discussion
of how rivalrousness fits into economic analysis of intellectual property law more broadly,
see generally John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price Discrimination
in Copyright Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1801 (2009); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and
ProductDifferentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 246-48 (2004).
See Stern, supra note 1, at 6, 9-10.
23.
24.
Id. at 25-28.
25.
This understanding has its critics, likely because of the inherently fuzzier
boundaries of much of intellectual property compared to much of property (and hence the
distinctions that arise as to the ability to give advance notice to potential infringers). That
said, these matters are often not as transparent as they seem in the property context,
either, with its focus on physicality in rivalrousness, as Stern points out in his work. See
generally Stern, supra note 1.
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to the public. From a policy perspective, a complete analysis must
hence take into account the tradeoffs present between increased
rivalrousness and (sometimes long-term, dynamic) gains on other
metrics. In the case presented here, and because we want to
incentivize particular types of new creations, we may thus (and in
fact do) accept transformative uses of copyrighted material that
may increase rivalrousness to some degree even though abolishing
fair use would likely result in higher royalties and hence a lesser
level of economic rivalrousness. 26 This symposium piece shows
what some of the conflicts and tradeoffs within each type of
intellectual property are, and how asking whether and how
rivalrousness is present can illuminate policy discussions in these
areas.

III. SLICING RIVALROUSNESS THINNER
Accepting a broader understanding of rivalrousness has
consequences both for grasping the current contours of intellectual
property law and for determining its optimal future. Indeed, such
an understanding shows why some types of intangible goods
already receive protection that resembles more closely that from
which the owners of tangible property benefit. The different
classes of intellectual property thus each occupy a band on the
spectrum of rivalrousness, and specific goods or types of goods
within each class can be placed along that band. More precisely, it
is the particular uses of intangible goods that will determine their
position on the spectrum. Each class of intellectual property will
contain uses that are highly versus barely (if at all) rivalrous, but
the pattern of clustering of uses will likely differ by type of
intellectual property.
A.

Trade Secrets

While most of trade secret regulation has historically been
governed by state laws-especially until the advent of the Defend
Trade Secrets Act (DTSA)-federal law currently defines a trade
secret as:
all forms and types of financial, business, scientific,
technical, economic, or engineering information, including
patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas,
designs,
prototypes, methods,
techniques, processes,
procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or

26.
It bears noting that royalties can exceed the amount of economic or other harm
caused by the new good. Whether they should do so in any given case, by way of legal
mandate, requires particularized policy analysis.
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intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or
memorialized
physically,
electronically,
graphically,
photographically, or in writing if- (A) the owner thereof has
taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret;
and (B) the information derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable through proper means by,
another person who can obtain economic value from the
disclosure or use of the information .... 27
The various state statutes, most of them modeled on the socalled Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), generally use quite
similar definitions. 2 8 For trade secrets, the concept of
rivalrousness is baked into the relevant statutes when: (1) the
owner must maintain the secrecy of the information, at least as
against the relevant public, and (2) a condition of economic
rivalrousness may be met because secrecy against the public must
be key to the value of the information. 29 If the owner shares the
information in an uncontrolled manner (or simply does not take
"reasonable measures" to maintain secrecy), he or she
automatically loses the trade secret right. 30
As Robert Hur has summarized, "Examples of trade secrets
recognized by the courts include a soft drink formula (Coca-Cola's
'Classic' formula may be the most famous trade secret), a rat
poison formula, a process for extracting alcohol from empty
whiskey barrels, a method of flavoring mouthwash, a technique for
picking locks," and also "a process of manufacturing orchestra
cymbals, a dog food recipe, a technique for making flypaper, a
technique for holding a group nonsmoking seminar ... and
designs for automatic toll collection equipment, customer lists, and
computer software."31 This list continues to expand, with
companies attracted by the potentially perpetual nature of trade
secrets-indeed, had Google patented its "PageRank" search
algorithm after inventing it in 1998, the patent would have
already expired by now, while the trade secret in the algorithm
merrily lives on. 32

&

27.
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012 & Supp. V 2018). For a history of the passage of the
DTSA and for data on the first cases adjudicated under it, see generally David S. Levine
Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at One: An Empirical Study of the First Year of
Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105 (2018).
28.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1986).
29.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4).
30.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).
31.
Robert K Hur, Takings, Trade Secrets, and Tobacco: Mountain or Molehill?, 53
STAN. L. REV. 447, 460-61 (2000).
32.
See Andrew A. Schwartz, The CorporatePreference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST.
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Robert Bone has stated that "trade secret law is an anomaly.
Copyright, patent, trademark, publicity rights, and various unfair
competition torts all confer property rights against the world,
rights that bind persons having no prior relationship to the
right-holder and that prohibit appropriation and use without
33
regard to how the information is obtained." Bone advocated for
the abolition of trade secret law in most instances and its
replacement with contract law devices. 34 Others, such as Michael
Risch, have disagreed. Risch argued that trade secrets deserve
protection "justified by the economic benefits that flow from their
existence, most notably incentives for businesses to spend less
money protecting secret information or attempting to appropriate
secret information[,] . .. under a Lockean 'labor value' theory[,
and] . . . as a means for the public to enforce populist norms about
'commercial ethics.' 3 5
The information covered by trade secrets is not inherently
nonrivalrous. 36 A trade secret owner may not experience any
economic or hedonic loss from the use of the trade secret by
another party under some circumstances. And indeed, the owner
can license the trade secret to another entity as long as that entity
is also required to maintain secrecy.3 7 Licensing is permitted for
other forms of intellectual property as well, with more limitations
38
in trademarks and fewer in copyrights and patents. How many
and what kind of licenses a trade secret owner can give out before
the requirement of economic value of the secret qua secret has
39
been destroyed is heavily context-dependent.
Trade secrets, and the existence of trade secret licenses,
provide a great example of the nonbinary nature of rivalrousness
when it comes to intangible goods: disclosure to some parties
L.J. 623, 651 (2013).
Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
33.
Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 243 (1998).
See id. at 296-304.
34.
Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
35.
1, 5-6 (2007).
See generally Joseph P. Fishman & Deepa Varadarajan, Similar Secrets, 167 U.
36.
PA. L. REV. 1051 (2019) (discussing the standard for determining in the trade secret context
how much similarity is too much).
See Michelle L. Evans, EstablishingLiability for Breach of Trade Secret License,
37.
in 141 AM. JtR. 3D Proofof Facts § 2, at 123 (2014). For a discussion of how trade secret
licenses are sometimes paired with patent licenses to hedge against the risk of patent
nongrants or invalidity determinations, see id; and also Michael Risch, Patent Challenges
and Royalty Inflation, 85 IND. L.J. 1003, 1039-40 (2010).
See discussions infra Sections III.B-.D.
38.
This is analogous to a trademark owner giving out so many licenses that the value
39.
of the mark diminishes.
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(usually in exchange for royalties or some other beneficial business
purpose) need not cause economic or hedonic problems, while
general disclosure frequently does. 40 The Supreme Court may have
implicitly recognized this when it held that if the Environmental
Protection Agency uses or discloses data submitted to it by the
Monsanto corporation, a taking of private property for public use
has occurred under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.4 1
Not only does a trade secret owner, or a trade secret infringer,
have the power to destroy the value of the secret (qua secret), but
so does the government because the secret is usually rivalrous.
Once secrecy is lifted, through whatever means, the
competitive edge of the secret's previous owner is generally gone.
The information is still of some value in that one is better off by
having it than not if one is in the relevant line of business, but it
no longer allows a developer or licensee to stand out. Interestingly,
in some cases, the loss of a trade secret would have dramatic
effects on the value of any related trademarks as well. How many
consumers would remain loyal to Coca-Cola if they could obtain
the exact same soda from a different manufacturer at a slightly
lower price? The answer is not zero. After all, some people continue
to use brand-name pharmaceuticals once generics with the
identical chemical formula become available. 42 The size of CocaCola's sales, and hence the value of the brand and related
trademarks as a whole, however, would quite certainly decline.
The high degree of rivalrousness of trade secrets may also
explain why there is no fair use doctrine in that area of intellectual
property. 43 For one, each use (even if the user promises to protect
the secret) presents a risk to maintaining the secrecy needed for
the original owner to keep her legal rights in the information.
While that is also true in a licensing situation, there the owner can
40.
For an example of both types of license, see Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek,
Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1197, 1200 (5th Cir. 1986) (discussing how the plaintiff-appellant
Metallurgical Industries disclosed, in exchange for a royalty, its zinc-recovery furnace
design trade secret to a European entity called La Floridienne, and without payment to a
furnace manufacturer named Consarc in hopes of pursuing a business relationship).
Limited sharing of trade secrets can result in beneficial network effects rather than
economically rivalrous uses (more often than indiscriminate sharing can).
41.
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984).
42.
See Suzanne S. Dunne & Colum P. Dunne, What Do People Really Think of
Generic Medicines? A Systematic Review and Critical Appraisal of Literature on
Stakeholder Perceptions of Generic Drugs, 13 BMC MED. 173 (2015) (noting a degree of
continuing mistrust of generic medications).
43.
This is not to say that there have been no proposals along those lines. See
generally Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1401 (2014)
(arguing that trade secret law needs to overcome its indifference to the social benefits of
unauthorized use the way that other types of intellectual property law have).
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price that risk into the cost of a license she is willing to award. In
that sense, and while the law currently has no genuine fair use
provision for either type of intellectual property, the case against
allowing fair use in the trade secret context is potentially stronger
than that against allowing meaningful fair use for patents.4 4
B.

Trademarks

Trademarks cover any word, symbol, or other signifier
capable of designating the source of a product. 45 Besides providing
source-identification, trademarks are also said to serve the goals
of guaranteeing quality and of facilitating advertising. 46 A
trademark encompassing these three goals necessarily becomes a
rivalrous resource because if sodas made by two different
manufacturers bear identical or confusingly similar "Coca-Cola"
labels, the source of each product will become much more difficult
to ascertain. Indeed, William Landes and Richard Posner have
argued that trademarks and the associated body of laws generally
seek to reduce consumer search costs in the form of time and
money spent looking for the desired product. 47 On the most basic
level, a trademark is rivalrous at the producer level because
consumers have preferences for some sources over others.
The multi-factor tests that try to detect the presence of
consumer confusion take this into account, seeking implicitly to
44.
It is worth emphasizing that this is a relative claim-in the sense of comparing
to fair use for other forms of intellectual property-rather than an absolute one. One can
imagine forms of trade secret fair use that could have more overall benefit than harm. I
would like to thank Deepa Varadarajan for our conversation on this topic.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining a trademark as "any word, name, symbol,
45.
or device, or any combination thereof-(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a
bona fide intention to use in commerce ... to identify and distinguish his or her goods,
including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown").
See generally Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal
46.
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948) (discussing the value of trade
symbols in representing the source of goods, the reputation of that source, and satisfaction
with the goods themselves). One can conceive of an alternative trademarks system that
does not seek to fulfill these three functions. For example, in the 1960s, for ideological
reasons China eliminated exclusive rights in trademarks and replaced them with a system
that would only require that certain quality requirements be met for products if registrants
wanted to begin and continue using a mark. See L. Mark Wu-Ohlson, A Commentary on
China's New Patent and Trademark Laws, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 86, 111-12 (1984). Of
course, this kind of concurrent use would not allow consumers to identify the exact source
of each product and would reduce the benefit of advertising. China reinstated exclusivity
in trademark law in the early 1980s, which "reflect[ed] the intention of the current regime
to encourage brand competition and put an end to the indiscriminate use of marks which
flawed the old system." Id. at 114.
47.
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267-70 (1987).
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separate rivalrous from other uses. We generally cannot go up to
a consumer and ask him: "Are you potentially or actually
confused?" Instead, we have to reach the answer to that question
indirectly. The best-known test for that purpose, the Polaroidtest
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, considers
the following factors:
the strength of [the original] mark, the degree of similarity
between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the
likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual
confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in
adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant's product,
and the sophistication of the buyers. 48
While this and similar tests in sister circuits are not free from
critique, 49 these tests attempt to tease out rivalrous uses while still
leaving enough terms for other entities that operate in unrelated
markets.5 0 For this purpose, we can only have one Gucci purse, but
Apple computers and Apple vinyl gloves can coexist.
There is another sense in which trademarks are rivalrous,
however, which is directly tied to how they are consumed once
purchased. For the consumers of some types of goods, the hedonic
enjoyment of a brand is greatly influenced by its exclusivity.5 1
Hence, an expansive understanding of rivalrousness would also
account for the types of losses occasioned by counterfeits and other
confusingly similar marks, whether the actual buyer of the good
was confused or not. 5 2 Even a prevalence of Mercedes-Benz pillows
or desks could detract from the identity and exclusivity of the
original car brand. As I have suggested in past work, concerns
about these latter examples could help to explain some of the
motivation behind antidilution laws. 5 3
Meanwhile, like for other forms of intellectual property,
licensing is permitted in trademark law, but it must be

48.
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
49.
See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for
Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1581-82, 1598-1603 (2006) (expressing
concern about how only a few factors are truly relevant while judges "stampede" the other
factors to make them conform to the desired result).
50.
Some scholars worry about whether the law is actually accomplishing this
outcome. See generally Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of
Trademarks? An Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 945 (2018) (arguing that the set of "good" trademarks available is practically finite).
51.
See Manta, supra note 22, at 266.
52.
See id. at 266-67.
See id. at 260-62; Irina D. Manta, Branded, 69 SMU L. REV. 713, 754-56 (2016).
53.
These are essentially examples of how overgrazing can affect both producers and
consumers.
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accompanied by the goodwill with which the mark is associated. 54
So-called naked licensing and assignment in gross are
prohibited.5 5 This seeks to ensure that the three basic functions of
trademarks remain safeguarded.5 6 Due to the relationship
between consumer preferences and rivalrousness, trademark
owners will only license uses that they do not perceive as
increasing rivalrousness (or at least not to a critical degree that
cannot be overcome by other benefits that arise from the licensing
arrangement). At the very least, just like with other forms of
intellectual property, owners would only do so if the license price
reflects that risk. Relatedly, if the government were to try and take
a trademark, it would likely have to pay just compensation for that
act.5 7

Unlike trade secrets, trademarks do allow for fair use.5 8 This
reflects principles similar to the ones found in the Polaroidtest:
some uses of marks can coexist. There are mainly two types of
recognized fair use in trademark law, nominative fair use and
descriptive fair use. In nominative fair use, an individual can use
another's trademark to refer to the mark owner or her goods,
whereas in descriptive fair use, someone uses another's trademark
to describe his own products or services. 59
Both of these types of uses are largely nonrivalrous even if the
level of confusion is not set at zero. 60 In one of the most significant
54.
See, e.g., Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929-30 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[R]egistered
trade names or marks may not be validly assigned in gross.").
15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (2012); Eva's Bridal Ltd. v. Halanick Enters., Inc., 639 F.3d
55.
788, 789-90 (7th Cir. 2011); Jonathan M. Barnett, Why Is Everyone Afraid of IP Licensing,
30 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 123, 125 (2017).
56.
See Brown, Jr., supranote 46, at 1185-91.
See Mitchell D. Diles, Note, Condemning Clothes: The Constitutionalityof Taking
57.
Trademarks in the ProfessionalSports FranchiseContext, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE
1, 53-57 (2016).
58.
See generally Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion About Confusion:
Trademark Policies and Fair Use, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 157 (2008) (analyzing the balance
between consumer confusion and the policies underlying fair use); William McGeveran, The
Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267 (2010) (discussing the background
of the fair use doctrine in trademark law and recommending reforms to protect true
instances of fair use); William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 49 (2008) (providing explanations of the five principal trademark fair use doctrines
and of their limitations in efficiently concluding trademark litigation); Lisa P. Ramsey,
Descriptive Trademarks and the FirstAmendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095 (2003) (arguing
that the fair use doctrine is too limited in trademark law and that elements of current
trademark law are unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
59.
For a description of these doctrines, see Jessica M. Kiser, Brands as Copyright,
61 VILL. L. REV. 45, 81-82 (2016).
60.
The Supreme Court has explained that "fair use can occur along with some degree
of confusion," but states in the same breath that this "does not foreclose the relevance of
the extent of any likely consumer confusion in assessing whether a defendant's use is
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cases involving what later became known as nominative fair use,
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, the Supreme Court held (almost a
century ago) that trademark owners do not have an absolute right
in their trademarks as words when such trademarks are "used to
tell the truth" rather than deceive consumers. 6 1 In the Prestonettes
case, the petitioner Prestonettes was selling a perfume product
that contained the respondent Coty's powder and that used Coty's
name in the explanation of what the perfume contained. 62 By not
confusing consumers, the petitioner did not greatly change the
ability of the respondent to use his trademark unencumbered.
Note that this is not an absolute statement; after all, for all we
know the Prestonettes company did cut into Coty's market and
reduced the value of his trademark to some degree if Coty's sales
went down-but that effect was likely minimal due to the
differences between the products and the fact that the Coty name
did not become a part of the Prestonettes brand name or of its
product's name (which distinguishes the case from scenarios
involving not just confusion but also dilution).
Descriptive fair use is in a similar predicament. For example,
in Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries,Inc., the juice-drinkmaker appellee was allowed to use the term "sweet-tart" to
describe its product even though the appellant sold candies called
"SweeTarts." 63 Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley have called
nominative and descriptive fair use (along with exemptions for
comparative advertising and safe harbors for news reporting and
commentary) instances of "non-trademark uses that are
specifically exempted from trademark law either by the statute or
by the courts, both because the defendant has used the mark in a
legitimate and nonsource-identifying way and because of the
excessive social costs if a jury were to find source or sponsorship
confusion likely."6 4 In the case of SweeTarts, the candy maker can
objectively fair." KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111,
122-23 (2004).
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924); see also New Kids on the
61.
Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[N]ominative use of a
mark-where the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing is pressed
into service-lies outside the strictures of trademark law: Because it does not implicate the
source-identification function that is the purpose of trademark, it does not constitute unfair
competition .... ). A negative Yelp review of a product that uses its name would fall into
this category, and in a small subset of cases, such a review could actually cause noticeable
economic and hedonic harm to the producer in a way that can, however, often be justified
through other factors, such as through corresponding gains to the public.
62.
See Prestonettes, Inc., 264 U.S. at 366-67.
Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1058-61 (7th Cir.
63.
1995).
64.
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
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continue selling its product unhampered by the juice-drink
manufacturer's adjectival use of sweet-tart. 65 From the
perspective of rivalrousness, the original trademark continues to
function separately, both due to the distinction in relevant
markets and the fact that SweeTart (or sweet-tart) does not
appear as part of the juice's brand name, among other reasons.
None of this is to say that the current boundaries of
trademark law-be they in the area of confusion, dilution, or fair
use-are necessarily optimal.6 6 But they do appear to adopt an
intuitive understanding that rivalrousness operates on a spectrum
and that it is a value to consider in shaping the law. Other values
certainly play key roles of their own; to name two important
examples, free speech and positive network effects in preserving
the ability to use a shared language influence a number of
trademark, and even more so copyright, policies.6 7 That said, both
for trademark and copyright law, rivalrousness matters.
C.

Patents

The Patent Act states that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor."6 8 Both patents and copyrights are protected
under the so-called Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, which seeks "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."6 9 As the Supreme Court has famously stated, there
is a "basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution ... for
granting a patent monopoly,"7 0 meaning that the inventor receives

&

Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1683-84 (2007).
65.
Sunmark, Inc., 64 F.3d at 1061.
66.
It is also not clear whether lawmakers always considered the problem of
trademark owners behaving in a bullying manner and seeking-via threatening cease-anddesist letters-to expand their rights beyond the actual legal boundaries. See generally
Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
ENT. L.J. 853 (2012) (discussing the negative market impacts of trademark bullying and
proposing substantive changes to current law).
67.
See generally Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of
Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2013) (arguing that
differences in copyright and trademark law with respect to the relative tension between the
free speech and intellectual property interests they are designed to protect are an
unintentional result of separate methods and histories of lawmaking).
68.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
69.
70.
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
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a monopoly right over an invention (currently for twenty years) in
exchange for disclosing the knowledge behind the invention to the
public, who can make free use of it once the patent term ends.7 1
Just as for trade secrets, the use of that knowledge is frequently
rivalrous, which is exactly why the patent owner is only willing to
share it (rather than keep it secret) if rewarded with special
protection.72
Patents have presented one of the hottest battlegrounds on
the topic of rivalrousness in intellectual property in part because
poor people, especially in developing countries, often cannot afford
access to medicine due to the (high or high-for-them) monopoly
prices set by patent owners. 73 Meanwhile, owners argue that they
need to set high prices due to the costs associated with researching
and developing drugs, only a small percentage of which ultimately
succeed in making it to market.7 4 This speaks to the "dynamic"
aspect of rivalrousness that James Stern emphasizes in his workmeaning that even if a good is, strictly speaking, nonrivalrous
today (e.g., several companies could make and sell a patented drug
without the patent owner necessarily suffering a loss in her
market), the risk of reduction of incentives could lead to
underproduction of other discoveries tomorrow.7 5
In the context of takings, the Supreme Court recently made a
strong connection between patents and tangible resources like
land when it stated: "[A patent] confers upon the patentee an
exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be
appropriated or used by the government itself, without just
compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use without
compensation land which has been patented to a private

&

See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(l)-(2) (2012).
71.
72.
See generally Richard S. Gruner, Dispellingthe Myth of Patents as Non-Rivalrous
Property: Patents as Tools for Allocating Scarce Labor and Resources, 13 COLUM. SCI.
TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012) (examining the role of patents in incentivizing the development of
four groundbreaking technologies). For a discussion of a Jeffersonian nonrivalrous
understanding of knowledge in the patent arena in the form of a taper that spreads light
between individuals without reducing the light at the source, see generally Jeremy Sheff,
Jefferson's Taper (Feb. 11, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=3332477 [https://perma.cc/DG7Q-AYXF].
73.
HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 136-52 (2007) (concluding that patents on pharmaceuticals

interfere with access to medicine in developing countries); Amir Attaran & Lee GillespieWhite, Do Patents for AntiretroviralDrugs ConstrainAccess to AIDS Treatment in Africa?,
286 J. AM. MED. AsS'N 1886, 1886-87, 1890 (2001) (stating that other, nonpatent-related

causes are to blame for the lack of access to AIDS medications in West Africa).
For a discussion of this argument, see Daniel R. Cahoy, Confronting Myths and
74.
Myopia on the Road from Doha, 42 GA. L. REV. 131, 166-67 (2007).
75.
Stern, supra note 1, at 47-48.
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purchaser." 76 This is so even though in most takings of patents,
the inventor would still be able to use and commercialize her
invention. The Supreme Court likely recognizes, however, that
patents are rivalrous resources, and that the government's use of
an invention diminishes what is left in the hands of the inventor.7 7
The question of which kinds of uses of patented inventions can
coexist-meaning which are truly nonrivalrous both in the static
and dynamic sense-nevertheless

becomes an empirical one. 78

This is certainly also true for other forms of intellectual property,
but some of them (such as trade secrets) tend to impose greater
structural limitations on concurrent use. 7 9 One of the questions
that this differential in limitations raises is whether the virtual
nonexistence of a doctrine of patent fair use makes sense. Several
scholars have proposed the introduction of such a doctrine, or the
broadening of the few exceptions for experimental use that exist
at this time.80 Fair use causes problems in the context of
rivalrousness if we take the extreme view of the concept that any
use where the intellectual property owner wishes the use were not
taking place creates a conflict, in which case all unlicensed use of
any intangible resource becomes suspect.8 1
If we view the owner's wishes, and his hedonic and economic
interests, in the aggregate-and follow more utilitarian
intuitions-we need not go that far. While patent licensing
certainly resolves many problems, some scholars have argued that
76.
Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015) (quoting James v. Campbell,
104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882)). For a discussion of whether post-issuance review of patents is a
taking, see Dolin & Manta, supra note 1, at 772-95.
Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427. This is in addition to the statutory protection that
77.
patent and copyright owners receive against infringement by the government. See infra
note 96 and accompanying text.
78.
There are certainly some independent inventors that do use the same technology
without affecting each other. A few scholars have gone as far as to argue that patent law
should include a defense for independent creation, like copyright law does. See generally
Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 475 (2006). But see generally Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require
Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525 (2007) (disagreeing with Vermont).
See supra Section III.A.
79.
80.
See generally Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in PatentLaw,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (arguing that fair use doctrine in patent law would serve
a socially desirable function of limiting the scope of rights in today's high-tech world); Sean
B. Seymore, Patentingthe Unexplained, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 707, 736-39 (2019) (arguing
that Congress should create an absolute experimental use defense for parties that make or
use patented subject matter to elucidate mechanistic details); Katherine J. Strandburg,
Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 265, 266 (2011) (noting that "[p]atent law has no
fair-use-type doctrine and the 'research exemptions' that exist are either very narrow or
available only in highly specific circumstances").
81.
For a discussion of the relationship between owner nonconsent and rivalrousness,
see Stern, supra note 1, at 55-60.
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in earlier times, "[p]atentees were unlikely to suppress their
innovations by refusing to license them, or to use their patents to
leverage whatever market power they possessed into secondary
markets." 82 In the modern era, however, "as the subject matter of
the patent law expands, patents proliferate, and high-tech
markets evolve, these traditional assumptions may prove
incorrect." 83 Deeper empirical analysis in this area will have to
examine the specific mechanisms through which inventors are
incentivized, including whether allowing for broader fair use such
as through greater exemptions for experimental uses of patented
devices and processes would have a negative effect on the overall
level of invention in the United States.
Figuring out the answers to these questions of rivalrousness
may be more crucial in the patent arena than in any other
intellectual property context. As important as artistic endeavors
are in copyright, or commercial ones in trademarks, most
individuals-at least if asked-are probably even more concerned
with the creation and proliferation of important pharmaceutical
drugs and other technological advancements. Understanding
which uses can coexist before incentives are negatively affected if
we misstep in either direction potentially becomes a literal
question of life and death.8
D.

Copyrights

No area of intellectual property tends to provoke as much
everyday discussion among nonspecialists as copyright law. Many
individuals are either confused about the limits of copyright or just
do not care at all about whether their own actions may be
infringing, usually because they do not think that they will get
caught.8 5 Copyright law covers an incredibly diverse array of
subject matters, such as literary works, musical compositions and
performances, both pictorial and sculptural visual art, and so on.86
82.
O'Rourke, supra note 80, at 1179.
Id.
83.
84.
There is certainly a spectrum of the extent to which this is true for each patent,
but both the strong end of the life-and-death spectrum and likely the average point on that
spectrum are higher for patents than their counterparts in the worlds of copyrights and
trademarks.
85.

See generally JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU

(2011) (discussing the ability of current copyright law to affect any individual in their
everyday life).
86.
See generally Pamela Samuelson, Evolving Conceptions of Copyright Subject
Matter, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 17 (2016) (discussing how U.S. copyright laws have evolved to
protect many new works, which were not clearly protected by the first Copyright Act of
1790).
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All these factors, and the great difficulties in determining the
existence of infringement and the boundaries of fair use, present
a complex image of the nature of rivalrousness for copyrighted
works.8 7
Many of copyright's doctrines can be traced back to implicit
ideas of rivalrousness. For example, the law must identify at which
so-called level of "abstraction" some types of works (such as the
plot of a book or movie) can be protected.8 8 "Boy meets girl" would
not be a protectable element because removing such a general plot
line from the public domain would prevent the creation of many
works that are likely not particularly rivalrous with each other
because the market can sustain a high number of such works. The
more detailed a plot is, however, the more another plot that
contains the same elements would be rivalrous.
Similar thinking is contained in the legal test for fair use in
copyright law. Statutory language dictates that any fair use shall
not be considered infringing, and that said use is to be determined
by:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.8 9
These factors, individually and collectively, essentially ask
whether the junior work and the senior work are rivalrous. In
some ways, the fourth factor does so most directly when it seeks to
inquire whether the junior work will push the senior work out of
the market. Looking at the first factor, a nonprofit educational
work is usually less likely to create a situation of rivalrousness
than a commercial work would. For the third factor, the less that
See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L.
87.
REV. 267 (2014) (using original empirical evidence to critique the reliance on fact-finders'
substantial similarity assessments in copyright infringement cases); Irina D. Manta,
Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303 (2012) (analyzing problems with the use of the
reasonable person standard in copyright infringement determinations).
See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). As Judge
88.
Easterbrook elaborated: 'T ... the court should select a high level of abstraction, the first
author may claim protection for whole genres of work . . .. Even a less sweeping degree of
abstraction creates a risk of giving copyright protection to 'the idea' although the statute
protects only 'expression."' Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990).
89.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 560-69 (1985) (applying the four-factor test).
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is used from the original work, the less likely rivalrousness is. And
the same is true for the second factor: some types of works will be
more rivalrous than others. There will be plenty of exceptions, but
these are not unreasonable general predictions when it comes to
rivalrousness.
In the context of unambiguous infringement, many
individuals believe-for example, in cases of illegal downloads of
music or movies-that their use is nonrivalrous. This is especially
true if they think or rationalize that they would not have bought
the work in question anyway, in which case they assume that not
only does their use not affect the original good in the static sense
of rivalrousness, but also in the dynamic one of considering the
creation of future works.
In keeping with each such user's fairly small effect in the
context of rivalrousness, the law has hardly pursued these
individuals. 90 This was interrupted by a brief wave of lawsuits that
deployed the statutory sanctions provisions of copyright law, 9 1
provisions whose original drafters surely did not foresee their
snowball effect in the illegal-download paradigm. 92 Generally,
copyright owners have gone after the actors whose use or
enablement of others' was so significant as to create conditions of
rivalrousness. 93 One such example was the successful lawsuit
against the Grokster file-sharing platform, whose owners the
Supreme Court held to have not just permitted, but in fact
induced, users to infringe. 94

&

90.
See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2004)
("Copyright owners tend not to sue those who trade software, video, or music files over the
[ilnternet.").
91.
See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 374-401 (2003)
(offering copyright policy recommendations based on a study of three instances of successful
copyright enforcement).
92.
See generally Irina D. Manta, The High Cost of Low Sanctions, 66 FLA. L. REV.
157 (2014) (noting the historical increase of enforcement and penalties in copyright
infringement cases).
See Lemley & Reese, supra note 90, at 1346-49 ("In the digital environment, the
93.
real stakes . . . have been in suing those who facilitate infringement by others.").
94.
See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005). While that also
created obstacles against users infringing on copyrighted goods, many of them turned to
other platforms to do so. There is debate as to whether the advent of cheap legal streaming
services addresses the issue of illegal downloads. Compare Tim Paul Thomes, An Economic
Analysis of Online Streaming Music Services, 25 INFo. EcoN. & POL'Y 81 (2013) (arguing
that music streaming services can fight digital piracy effectively), with Karla Borja
Suzanne Dieringer, Streaming or Stealing? The Complementary Features Between Music
Streaming and Music Piracy, 32 J. RETAILING & CONSUMER SERVS. 86 (2016) (stating that
streaming services are not viewed as a low-cost substitute for piracy and that those who
stream are more likely to engage in piracy).
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Some copyrighted goods are rivalrous not only in the dynamic
but also in the static sense, however. While often music listeners
can benefit from positive network effects, a limited-edition music
album, for example, can function much like a purse that has an
exclusive brand and whose experience is diminished by
widespread distribution. The hedonic enjoyment that consumers
can experience in the copyright context is similar in kind to that
obtained by some users in the trademark setting. There are likely
fewer such types of copyrighted goods than trademarked ones, but
those that do exist can fall close to a number of trademarked wares
on the spectrum of rivalrousness.
The recognition that much copyright use can take place
concurrently without significant problems of rivalrousness may
have contributed to the development of the compulsory licenses we
see at times for copyrighted musical works. Songs can be covered
and played in many places, with compensation to the owner,
without impairing the owner's ability to use and exploit the value
of the original.9 5 When considering derivative works, however,
Congress may have remained more skeptical that multiple
(especially commercial) uses could operate without causing
friction. In that context, copyright and trademark functions can
blend together in that, for example, the equivalent of trademark
law's likelihood of confusion could arise as to which is the
authoritative sequel of the copyrighted Harry Potter series.
Last, if the law did not view copyrighted works as at least
potentially rivalrous, it likely would not require the government
to pay compensation in the case of infringement or of a taking,
such as it does via statutory mechanisms.9 6 In Gaylord v. United
States, for example, the U.S. Postal Service was held liable for
infringing an artist's copyright when it depicted without
permission soldier sculptures that were part of the Korean War
Veterans Memorial. 9 7 As Roberta Kwall has also explained, if the
government utilizes an owner's copyrighted good in a way that
does not constitute fair use, it should owe just compensation like
for other types of takings.9 8 While she believes that-unlike in

See generally Jenna Hentoff, Compulsory Licensing of Musical Works in the
95.
DigitalAge: Why the CurrentProcess Is Ineffective & How Congress Is Attempting to Fix It,
8 J. HIGH TECH. L. 113 (2008) (discussing supply-side innovations in the music industry
that allow for legal enjoyment of music).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012) (requiring the United States government to
96.
compensate the owners of copyrights or patents it infringes).
Gaylord v. United States, 777 F.3d 1363, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
97.
See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The
98.
Sovereign's Prerogative,67 TEX. L. REV. 685, 769 (1989).
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suits involving private infringers-courts should not issue an
injunction in such cases, she would still require the government to
pay for its use. 99 Meanwhile, Richard Epstein has stated
unambiguously his conviction "that the full takings apparatus
should apply to intellectual property as it does to physical
property."10 0
E.

Looking to the Futureof Intellectual Property and
Rivalrousness

As with patents and probably more so, questions arise as to
whether the current level of restrictiveness is truly needed to
preserve rivalrousness values across the copyright legal arena. 10 1
Empirical questions abound regarding many matters in this
context, including the relationship between the length of the
copyright term and dynamic rivalrousness, though scholars have
begun addressing some of them.1 02 Further examination is also
warranted of the intent behind and effects of infringement across
types of intellectual property. We may view a copyright or patent
infringer and his actions quite differently, for example, depending
on whether he is a direct competitor of the original owner and
sought to harm her economically; in other words, it is worth
inquiring into the level of rivalrousness that the infringement
creates.
This may have been partly captured in the Supreme Court's
analysis in the eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C. case, which held
that patent infringement should be subjected to the four-part test
traditionally applied in courts of equity before the issuance of an
injunction as opposed to damages. 103 The first factor of the test

99.
Id.
100.
Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegrationof Intellectual Property? A Classical
Liberal Response to a PrematureObituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 514 (2010).
See generally Jane C. Ginsburg et al., The Constitutionalityof Copyright Term
101.
Extension: How Long Is Too Long?, 18 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651 (2000) (presenting
various arguments regarding copyright protection extensions); Lawrence Lessig,
Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001) (noting the significant and
unexplained increase in copyright restrictiveness today relative to the federalists' approach
to copyright protection); Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper
Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45 (2000) (analyzing
whether Congress has exceeded the scope of its constitutional power in enacting ever more
restrictive patent and copyright laws).
102.
See generally Christopher Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen
When Works Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2013) (countering arguments for prolonging the copyright
protection time period with findings from empirical studies).
103.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
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requires the plaintiff to "ha[ve] suffered an irreparable injury," 104
which would also entail that the infringing use was rivalrous. The
goal of this symposium piece is not to argue whether eBay was
decided correctly, and its holding has certainly been subject to
serious criticism. 105 Rather, this piece notes that the result in that
case seems to display an implicit understanding of the idea that
some forms of intellectual property infringement are more
economically rivalrous than others, and predicts that we are likely
to continue seeing rivalrousness play a role in many judicial
decisions in the years to come.
IV. CONCLUSION

Rivalrousness is best viewed as a fine-grained rather than
binary issue, and its degree differs both by type of intellectual
property and within each type. As this symposium contribution
shows, trade secret uses are generally on the high end of the
rivalrousness spectrum, followed by many types of trademark
uses. The picture is more complicated when it comes to patents
and copyrights. Many uses in those areas, and especially in
copyright, are not inherently rivalrous to the same degree as is
true for other types of intellectual property. Some of the most
intense conflicts about questions of rivalrousness are in areas that
either have extremely high stakes-such as in some
pharmaceutical contexts where life and limb are at risk-or arise
with great frequency in everyday life, such as when it comes to
many forms of accidental or allegedly low-harm copyright
infringement.
The presence or absence of rivalrousness, while often
complicated by empirical questions, ought to inform policy in each
area of intellectual property. The effect of concurrent uses is highly
relevant, though not always conclusive, to whether some of these
uses should be permitted. Just like assumptions that intellectual
property infringement is necessarily "theft" are misplaced, so are
overly expansive conclusions rooted in the fact that intangible
resources do not compete with each other in a purely physical
sense. While this symposium contribution does not seek to resolve
definitively which direction intellectual property law should
take-or even to what extent it should give rivalrousness

Id.
104.
105.
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 100, at 489-91 ("The injunction avoids a regime of
compulsory licenses at the insistence of the infringer that would on average
undercompensate the owners for their investment and make it impossible for patent
holders to develop coherent licensing strategies that target select licenses under complex
licensing deals.").
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precedence over other factors or values-it has shown the effects
and ramifications of a concept of rivalrousness that truly accounts
for the many different ways in which goods can "displace" one
another.

